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Professor Hitchens, writing from Australia, sees a dramatically different regulatory 
framework in a post-convergence “Broadband Age.” Future media policy and 
regulation, she says, will have to address the entire “media ecosystem,” viewed as a 
“regulatory space” in which self-regulation and the market are all part of the basket 
of regulatory tools. Its goal should be to maintain and strengthen the public 
sphere. Traditional rules limiting media ownership or setting content requirements 
are unlikely to be viable, and will be replaced by increased reliance on sectoral ex 
ante competition regulation, perhaps complemented by a code of behavior 
promoting self-regulation regarding content. Hitchens concludes that traditional 




It is a relatively common occurrence to assert that the media space is undergoing change, and that 
technology is a driver for change and disruption in the way media is delivered and used. However, it 
seems generally accepted that now something quite fundamental is occurring. Although the concept 
of convergence has had currency for a while, and many “false dawns,”1 it is apparent that now, with the 
prospect of superfast ubiquitous broadband, full reign can be given to convergence and its use of 
common digital technologies. Traditional understanding and models of media are being 
transformed, and this is not just a localized phenomenon.2 The transformations are not only about 
the change in the way traditional media operates and is delivered; there are changes also in the 
public‟s engagement with media and the transformation of audience into content creator. These 
changes are imposing tensions on established regulatory assumptions and frameworks. Australia is 
witnessing these changes also 3  and at the end of December 2010, the Federal Government of 
Australia announced a review of media and communications regulation, establishing the 
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1 Ofcom, What is Convergence? A Submission to the Convergence Think Tank by Ofcom, Feb. 7, 2008, ¶ 1.7. 
2 Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (Australia) [hereinafter BCDE], Convergence 
Review, Background Paper, 2010, accessed Apr. 28, 2011, 
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/digital_economy/convergence_review/convergence_review_background, ii-iii. 
3 As at June 2010, 77% of the population aged 14 and over had access to the Internet at home, whilst 66% of those 14 
and over had a home broadband service. Australian Communications and Media Authority [hereinafter ACMA], 
Australia in the Digital Economy: The Shift to the Online Environment, 2009–10 Communications Report Series, Report No. 1, 
Nov. 11, 2010. 
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Convergence Review.4 The Review Committee commenced its work in mid-2011, and is expected to 
report in March 2012. Although the Australian media environment is changing, the lack of access 
both in terms of availability and affordability of superfast broadband has constrained this growth.5 
However, this too is changing. In April 2009, the Australian Government announced that it would 
build a national broadband network (NBN) to provide a fiber-to-the-premises network to 90% of 
Australian homes, schools and work premises, within urban and regional areas, delivering speeds of 
up to 100 megabits per second. 6  The remaining 10% represents the remote rural areas where 
broadband will be delivered by satellite and wireless services, with speeds of up to 12 megabits or 
better per second. This significant public infrastructure undertaking was decided upon because the 
Government was not confident that existing telecommunications networks could meet the growing 
demand for superfast broadband or deliver broadband across the nation – a challenge given 
Australia‟s particular geographic and demographic characteristics.7     
The NBN is controversial but if the rollout is completed then it will substantially change the 
Australian communications landscape.8 Despite a high level of connectedness in Australia, services 
such as Internet protocol television (IPTV) have only recently begun to be available, although catch-
up services delivered via the open Internet are becoming well-established.9 Already the regulatory 
pressures are being felt as it is unclear whether IPTV services, for example, would be classified as a 
“broadcasting service” and therefore be subject to the licensing regime under the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992.10 The Convergence Review is intended to be comprehensive, although it has to 
be said that Australia does not have a good record on media policymaking.11 Nevertheless, the 
Convergence Review provides an opportunity to consider how the media broadband environment 
                                                            
4 BCDE, Convergence Review. 
5 According to OECD statistics, Australia remains one of the most expensive countries for broadband connection: 
Senator Stephen Conroy, “Australians Still Pay Too Much for Broadband,” media release, Apr. 14, 2011, accessed Apr. 
16, 2011, http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2011/157. Senator Conroy relied upon three 
indicators regarding average broadband subscription prices: very low-speed connections (less than 2.5 Mbps); high-speed 
connections (15-30 Mbps); and very-high-speed connections (more than 45 Mbps). Australia was one of the lowest-
priced for 2.5-15 Mbps and was not included in the statistics for 30-45 Mbps. The statistical information can be accessed 
at Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, 
OECD Broadband Portal, accessed Sept. 8, 2011, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3746,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html#prices.   
6 For a discussion as to whether the commitment to fiber networks is a sound policy decision, see Catherine A. 
Middleton and Jock Given, “The Next Broadband Challenge: Wireless,” Journal of Information Policy 1 (2011): 36-56. 
7 Lesley Hitchens, “Broadband in Australia: First Steps in Policy and Regulation,” The Journal of Media Law 2, no. 2 
(2010): 215-216.   
8 It is expected that complete rollout will take eight years, but already some sites are operating or being tested. Ibid., 216. 
9 Australian Communications and Media Authority [hereinafter ACMA], IPTV and Internet Delivery Models: Video Content 
Services over IP in Australia, June 2010, accessed July 7, 2011, 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib311865/iptv_and_internet_video_delivery_models.pdf, 11-12. 
10 See, for example, Luke Waterson and Nicholas Dowsley, “Cold, Dead Hand? Broadcasting Regulation and the 
Emergence of the National Broadband Network,” Communications Law Bulletin 28, no. 1 (2009); David Brennan, “Is IPTV 
an Internet Service under the Australian Broadcasting and Copyright Law?” Telecommunications Journal of Australia 60, no. 2 
(2010). 
11 See for example the critique by the Productivity Commission of the quid pro quo approach to broadcasting policy in 
Australia arguing that it lacked transparency and consistency: Productivity Commission (Australia), Broadcasting: Report 
No 11, Mar. 3, 2000, 55-56.   
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 




might be designed to ensure that this media space continues to offer the public the means to access 
information and ideas.   
The purpose of this article is to try to sketch the regulatory landscape that might emerge.12 The 
article does this by examining five regulatory tools used in the traditional media environment and the 
policy goals they were designed to address. It asks whether those tools are still applicable or is there 
a need to contemplate amended versions or new tools. The environment with which this article is 
concerned is established, changing, and emerging, and it is difficult to be definitive, especially as 
these issues are explored from the prism of law and regulation. In such a changing environment 
there is a particular need for a much broader disciplinary perspective to explain and predict how 
media in this broadband age will evolve. This is also important because the environment seems to 
require one to deal with competing tensions at the same time: we have one-to-many and one-to-one 
communications; content being pushed and pulled; the public being both audience and creator; and, 
concerns about piracy amidst moves to share content freely and openly. Developments like these are 
making the policy and regulatory task much more difficult. 
 
EXPLORING THE TERRAIN 
Mapping 
The title of this article refers to the “Age of Broadband.” The phrase is important because it 
implicitly acknowledges that whilst this is a period in which broadband has become the dominant 
technology and service driving change, it does not define or describe all media activity. It is 
redefining the media and engagement with it, but it is not the entire experience. This may change but 
for the present and the foreseeable future, there is – and will be – a mix of platforms and media 
experiences, from the old one-to-many institutional fixed media to the new interactive grassroots 
mobile media. In contemplating the response to the broadband age, this needs to be kept in mind. 
Policy and regulation must be considered across the entire environment; otherwise there is a risk of 
regulatory imbalance and pressure points in this heterogeneous environment. 
One of the difficulties when considering policy and regulatory responses is how to describe the 
subject matter. In the pre-broadband age, it was relatively simple to do this and to determine where 
and how to affix the regulatory impost. The (mass) media was understood as encompassing the 
press, radio and television. Although technically quite different, they nevertheless operated in similar 
and discrete ways. In the main they were one-to-many forms of communication, and the audience 
had relatively limited control over when and how the content could be accessed. Content was 
generally distributed across the one delivery platform (even with the arrival of cable and satellite 
technology, there was no substantive change). The form of the content was predictable also: 
newspapers delivered text; radio, voice; and, television delivered voice and visual content. Content 
                                                            
12 This article is deliberately schematic and it begs for further and more detailed research on each of the canvassed 
regulatory tools. 
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was generally not shared between the media. Finally, the physical reach of the medium ensured that 
it was possible to impose some jurisdictional borders for regulatory purposes. 13 Of course it is 
possible to overstate the simplicity of the pre-broadband age. Each new communications technology 
development created its own disruptive policy and regulatory challenges, but it is suggested that 
there are developments in the broadband age which are making policy and regulatory development 
especially complex. Developments, such as those canvassed in this article – are changing the nature 
of the relationship between content provider and delivery platform and audience and producer – are 
upsetting the traditional vertical, silo-based approaches to regulation.   
But this position has changed dramatically, and almost all of the characteristics of mass media just 
described can no longer be relied upon as a defining feature. Another significant change is the 
growth of user-generated content (UGC). Here one struggles with concepts because a reference to 
UGC can clearly encompass a vast array of activity – from the YouTube home video, to the teenage 
Facebook page, to the twitter feed, to the video or photos shot via a mobile phone during a civil 
uprising and distributed worldwide, to the blogs – amateur and professional, public and private. The 
term “social media” is also used here; but if the term was meant to connote a media which was 
primarily occurring within the private sphere (albeit with a public interface), designed to facilitate 
personal, informal and social communications (much as the telephone in its earlier vanilla form did), 
then clearly that meaning no longer adequately describes what is happening. Whether it is described 
as UGC or social media, it clearly cannot be ignored. Whilst some of that UGC may not be relevant, 
aspects of it are, and it is apparent that some forms of UGC are taking on media-like roles. Deciding 
what of this activity belongs in this space is part of the challenge. What also complicates 
understanding of this environment is that some of the activity takes place outside the usual market 
processes, and, indeed, may occur for non-economic motives and encourage open sharing and 
networking of content.14 
Although this article has suggested that the current (and emerging) media environment is 
qualitatively different from the one around which the familiar policy and regulatory frameworks 
have been built, it is not being suggested that this is a situation in which the new is pushing out or 
replacing the old. Whilst there are disruptive technologies in play – enabled by broadband – there 
remains a more fluid scenario. The new does not replace the old – at least not yet – but it may 
displace it, obliging the old to adapt and accommodate to the new. One can see this in the way that, 
for example, the print media have adapted to the emergence of the online environment (albeit that 
they may not yet have developed the business model to support this). 
Having regard then to these complexities and this fluidity, the concept of the “ecosystem” may be 
useful as a way to describe the current media environment. It contemplates the idea of a community 
of organisms, which are living, changing, and adapting or disappearing, and it serves as a reminder 
                                                            
13 It was not quite as simple as this, as the experience of Europe and the European Union‟s Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive ([2007] OJ L 332/27) demonstrates. A codified version of the directive is now available: [2010] OJ L 95/1. 
14 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 7; cited in John Naughton, “Our Changing Media Ecosystem” in Communications: The Next 
Decade, ed. Ed Richards, Robin Foster, and Tom Kiedrowski (London: Ofcom, 2006), 41. 
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that the regulatory responses must also be adaptable and responsive.15 The term media ecosystem will 
be used in this article. It is a useful means of distinguishing from old descriptions of the media and it 
also serves as a reminder that, when talking about policy and regulation in the broadband age, it is 
necessary to be inclusive. So within this media ecosystem one may find the traditional media, 
including the press, the new broadband services such as IPTV, independent online journals, the 
blogs, delivery platforms, content creators and journalists, amateur and professional, and so forth. It 
might be thought that to contemplate the ecosystem in this way is too far-reaching, but it could be 
argued that some of these new players are already claiming the space themselves. For example, shield 
laws recently enacted in Australia recognize the citizen journalist and blogger.16  
Policy and Regulation – Restating the Normative Link 
The title of this article refers to “securing diversity” but this is not intended to suggest that diversity 
is the goal. Diversity is certainly a vital ingredient, but to mistake it for the goal in developing media 
policy risks building a weak policy basis. This is apparent in a paper recently issued by the 
Convergence Review Committee. Known as the Framing Paper, the paper sets out for consultation a 
set of principles to inform the Review‟s work. “Diversity of voices, views and information” is 
offered as one of the principles but without any normative underpinnings that might help to explain 
the nature of diversity and the role it should play.17 Media regulation – especially because of the 
differential treatment of print and broadcasting – has always suffered from weak and negative 
rationales for regulation. The result has been a rather grudging acceptance of regulation (usually as 
part of a trade-off for spectrum allocations or some other subsidy) with reasonably regular attempts 
by the media industry to push back the regulatory front. More so than ever, this push will be seen in 
the broadband age, especially because regulatory imbalances are likely to be magnified. So it seems 
especially important (and indeed an opportunity) at this time to be able to articulate a strongly 
coherent normative case for the role the media should play in the community. With that 
understanding one can begin to look at how the media ecosystem might need to be shaped to ensure 
the realization of that role.  
The concept of the “public sphere” continues to be of value.18 It has been much debated and 
refined, but in essence the public sphere provides “…an important space for the generation, 
consideration, and formation of public opinion, which in turn facilitates the democratic process.”19   
And the media have become “…the chief institutions of the public sphere.”20 The media, in all its 
                                                            
15 Naughton, 42. The term is also used by the Federal Communications Commission (US), Connecting America: The 
National Broadband Plan (2010).  
16 Evidence Amendment (Journalists‟ Privilege) Act of 2011 (Australia). See also Evi Werkers et al., “Ethics and Rights 
for Online Journalists: Inseparable and Obligatory” (paper presented at the “End of Journalism” International 
Journalism Conference, Luton, Oct. 17-18, 2008). 
17 Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (Australia) [hereinafter BCDE], Convergence 
Review, Framing Paper, 2011, accessed June 20, 2011, 
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/133903/Convergence_Review_Framing_Paper.pdf, 12. 
18 See further Lesley Hitchens, Broadcasting Pluralism and Diversity: A Comparative Study of Policy and Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 
2006), chapter 2.   
19 Ibid., 58. 
20 Peter Dahlgren, Television and the Public Sphere: Citizenship, Democracy and the Media (London: Sage, 1995), 8.   
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rich and wonderful new guises, still has a crucial role to play: “…to provide a focus for citizens 
within that space, to provide access to different voices, and to facilitate debate.”21 So the crucial 
question then becomes what is needed to ensure that the media is able to fulfill its important civic 
role. A media ecosystem characterized by diversity in structure, service, and content will be essential 
to this role.  
It has been suggested that with the growth of blogging and other forms of interactive online 
engagement that a re-energized public sphere has emerged.22 But there is a need for caution here, 
even though one may be inclined to agree with this statement. It is the case that the media 
ecosystem seems to be characterized by abundance – there are multiple ways in which news, 
information and opinion, and entertainment content can be accessed. Of course, very often one is 
simply receiving much the same content via these new platforms, as would be received via the 
traditional platforms. And so there is a need for caution to ensure that one is not misled by an 
illusion of diversity. Scarcity may be present despite the appearance of abundance. 
Nevertheless, there are clearly new and different kinds of voices out there with varying degrees of 
professionalism and commercialism: the independent online opinion papers, the blogs, the citizen 
journalists, Twitter, and even Facebook. All are contributing to the discourse. But here too there is a 
need for caution: if the media is to play its part in the public sphere, the public needs also to be 
equipped to make the best use of what the media provides. Habermas has commented: “Use of the 
Internet has both broadened and fragmented the contexts of communication. …[T]he less formal, 
horizontal cross-linking of communication channels weakens the achievements of traditional media. 
This focuses the attention of an anonymous and dispersed public on select topics and information, 
allowing citizens to concentrate on the same critically filtered issues and journalistic pieces at any 
given time. The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the Internet is the 
decentralised access to unedited stories.”23 
So within that abundance there may be chaos and here there may be a need to ensure that 
frameworks are in place so that the public has a means of negotiating through this content. It is 
worth remembering also Sunstein‟s concerns about the potential for the public to bypass the 
“general-interest intermediaries,” instead restricting “...themselves to opinions and topics of their 
own choosing...” and “...listening to louder echoes of their own voices...” 24 For Sunstein this is a 
problem more serious even than the fragmentation occasioned by the new communications 
technologies.  
To be seen to quibble with diversity being offered as the policy goal may seem just that: a quibble; 
but in putting the goal in that way it can be too easy for this to be elided into a debate over spectrum 
scarcity. By focusing on the need to ensure that the media is able to carry out its role and 
                                                            
21 Hitchens, Broadcasting Pluralism and Diversity, 58. 
22 Naughton, 48. 
23 Jürgen Habermas, “Towards a United States of Europe,” Sign and Sight.com, Mar. 27, 2006, accessed Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.signandsight.com/features/676.html. 
24 Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 13, 31. 
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responsibility within the public sphere, it should be possible to have a broader discussion about what 
is needed to aid that. 
 
THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
The Regulatory Space 
In thinking about the regulatory framework and especially the regulatory tools that may be deployed, 
it may be more useful to consider not regulation but the regulatory space. To refer to regulation risks 
simplistic or even false dichotomies, such as for example the idea that the press is not regulated, 
whilst broadcasting is. There is a risk also that the basket of regulatory tools is conceived narrowly. 
Regulatory space recognizes that regulatory power and authority will not be held within a single formal 
body, but may be dispersed between any number of entities, both private and public, within the 
relevant space.25 In this way, it minimizes the problem of setting up public and private interests in 
opposition: “Instead, the idea of regulatory space emphasises a place where regulation occurs, 
almost a kind of physical arena which influences the practices that happen within it.” 26  The 
regulatory space allows for a more complex mix of regulatory activity which may be especially 
relevant in the emerging media ecosystem.27 It can accommodate a variety of regulatory tools from 
the market through self-regulation to centralized command regulation, and it enables different 
jurisdictional responses to similar policy objectives. 
The regulatory space concept also avoids the idea of the market or the discipline of the market as being 
non-regulation or beyond regulation. It sees the market as simply another regulatory or disciplinary 
instrument within the space, which can be used when it is appropriate. This avoids also the 
perception of regulation as a departure from the norm, namely the market,28 or as second-best.29 
Regulatory Review and Mapping  
The following sections review five regulatory approaches that have been used to promote or protect 
diversity in the traditional media environment. These regulatory approaches were relied upon, rather 
than the market-as-regulator approach, because it was considered that the market could not deliver 
the range of content deemed important for a thriving and engaged public sphere nor prevent the 
tendency towards concentration.30 In reviewing these approaches, this article will consider whether 
                                                            
25 Colin Scott, “Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design,” Public Law (Summer 
2001): 331. See also Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, “Organizing Regulatory Space” in A Reader on Regulation, ed. 
Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 148-172.   
26 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 59.   
27 Scott, 330-331. 
28 Thomas Gibbons, Regulating the Media (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 9-10.   
29 Tony Prosser, “Regulation and Social Solidarity,” Journal of Law and Society 33, no. 3 (2006): 365. 
30 Carolyn Fairburn, “Serving the Public Good in the Digital Age: Implications for UK Media Regulation,” in 
Communications: The Next Decade, ed. Ed Richards, Robin Foster, and Tom Kiedrowski (London: Ofcom, 2006), 73. 
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they are necessary in the media ecosystem. (If they are not necessary, one is suggesting that the 
discipline of the market will suffice.) If some intervention is necessary, are these approaches still 
viable or can they be refashioned, or, is it necessary to look to new approaches to meet the policy 
objectives? 
One of the challenges in the media ecosystem is how to make regulation “bite.” The familiar trade-
off or quid pro quo of spectrum for regulatory obligation may not be as attractive or as viable. 
Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the ecosystem makes it much more difficult to use uniform 
regulatory approaches such as licensing, whilst the online platform means that there is much more 
scope for regulatory bypass. The difficulty of framing the regulatory bite and achieving the required 
scope is illustrated by the European Union‟s Audiovisual Media Services Directive.31 This directive 
sought to bring within the regulatory net online and mobile media services (termed “non-linear 
audiovisual media services”) as well as the traditional television broadcasting services (termed “linear 
audiovisual media services”). Not all these audiovisual media services would be captured though, for 
example licensing regimes, and so the directive continues to rely upon a “country of origin” 
approach – that is, the place (member state) where the media service provider is established. 
However, the directive only covers those media service providers who exercise editorial 
responsibility. This means that those content providers who only package content are outside the 
directive‟s regulatory reach.32 The third parties that exercise the editorial responsibility may of course 
be outside the European Union‟s jurisdiction. 
The other regulatory challenge is determining the scope of regulation in relation to the range of 
actors in the media ecosystem. With the growth of UGC activity within the public sphere, how 
broadly should the regulatory net extend? The Audiovisual Media Services Directive has confined its 
reach to commercial activities through the definition of an “audiovisual media service” (and there 
would be constitutional limits on regulating non-economic activities). 33  In the dynamic media 
ecosystem, it is likely that the question about the reach of the regulatory net will change over time 
and for different purposes. One approach may be to ask whether the service offered has become or 
is likely to become “…a „mainstream‟ means of media consumption for many people.”34 
Regulatory Tool I: Structuring the Broadcasting Market 
The term structuring the broadcasting market is intended to refer to the way in which rules have been in 
place to ensure that the broadcasting market is comprised of differently constituted broadcasting 
sectors. The most familiar examples of this are those jurisdictions that have publicly funded and 
                                                            
31 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, [2007] OJ L 332/27 and codified version: [2010] OJ L 95/1. 
32 Ibid., art. 1(d). Recital 26 makes clear that the directive is intended to exclude providers who only transmit programs 
where third parties exercise editorial responsibility. See also Peggy Valcke et al., “Audiovisual Media Services in the EU: 
Next Generation Approach or Old Wine in New Barrels?” Communications and Strategies 71, no. 3 (2008): 103. 
33 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, art. 1(a). See also Valcke et al., 115-116. For an extensive discussion of UGC 
and a suggestion that some UGC activity might constitute economic activity (though the position is generally 
ambiguous), see Natali Helberger et al., “Legal Aspects of User Created Content,” Nov. 3, 2009, accessed Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333, 25-28.   
34 Fairburn, 73.  
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private, commercially funded broadcasting sectors.35 The rationale being that differently constituted, 
governed, and funded broadcasting outlets will promote diversity of voice and content, because it 
will ensure that not all programming decisions are subject to commercial imperatives.36 The UK has 
probably had the most unique example of this structured market with its mix of a publicly funded 
broadcaster, the BBC, and a commercial sector which was also subject to significant programming 
obligations – the public service broadcasting mandate, although that mandate has broken down 
somewhat since the UK Communications Act 2003. 
As a regulatory tool designed to promote diversity of content, is there a continued need for this type 
of sector structuring, and can it be applied practically in the media ecosystem? The strategy of 
structuring the sector has sought to ensure that certain types of content would be produced, which 
might not otherwise have been produced if left to the market. With more scope for new content 
creators/providers to enter the market and the much greater opportunity users have to access a 
greater range of content, across a greater range of platforms, is there a need, through separate 
licensing or other arrangements, to continue to structure the market to ensure the availability of 
public interest content? Several other factors are relevant to this inquiry. 
Traditional media operations are under pressure to rebuild their business models as new platforms 
emerge; and as competition for advertising revenue intensifies and audiences fragment. 37  The 
opportunities for greater economies of scale and scope are likely to serve as an incentive to exploit 
these platforms to maximize opportunities for consumption of existing content. 38  The “public 
good” nature of broadcasting content also encourages a move to multi-platform delivery,39 although 
presumably determinations of marginal cost and the extent of competitive pressure will affect the 
nature of that re-use, and whether it will be a simple recycling of the content or a re-use with some 
added value, such as scope for interactive audience engagement. As Doyle suggests, there is now a 
qualitative difference in the way audiences engage with content which has to be responded to: 
Research conducted by …Ofcom, confirms that although broadcast television 
remains supreme in its popularity, audiences are embracing the additional choice, 
control and opportunities for participation offered by the internet and mobile 
connectivity.  …[Jenkins] argues that shifts in the strategies of media organizations 
towards a more multi-platform approach and towards a re-balancing of top-down 
                                                            
35 There are other variations of course. In Australia, for example, a community broadcast sector also operates. This has 
similarities with the US public broadcasting sector; see also Hitchens, Broadcasting Pluralism and Diversity, 76-79. The UK 
introduced a community radio sector in 2005.   
36 Federal Communications Commission (US), Second Report and Order, In the Matter of Commission Policy Concerning the 
Noncommercial Nature of Educational Broadcast Stations, 86 FCC 2d 141 (1981).   
37 BCDE, Convergence Review. Background Paper, 13-14. 
38 Gillian Doyle, “From Television to Multi-Platform: Less from More or More for Less,” Convergence 16, no. 4 (2010): 
432. The desire to take advantage of economies of scale and scope is not of course new to the media industry. Anyone 
familiar with media ownership and control debates will know that this has been a familiar argument, although whether 
the argued economic benefits were in fact available was questionable. See for example the critique of these arguments in 
relation to UK media ownership reform processes in Gillian Doyle, Media Ownership (London: Sage, 2002). However, 
digital convergence may be making those economies much more realizable. 
39 Doyle, “From Television to Multi-Platform,” 433. 
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versus bottom-up participatory culture „is being driven by economic calculations and 
not by some broad mission to empower the public‟.  But can the two be neatly 
separated?  If digitized, platform-neutral, interactive and multi-layered forms of 
content is what audiences demand, it surely follows that more resources ought to be 
directed towards supplying this.40 
Although Doyle‟s research into the UK television sector suggests that economies of scale and scope 
may not be the only driver for the industry to move across platforms, it is nevertheless significant.41 
However, her research also finds that distribution across multiple platforms is likely to increase 
costs, especially as audience expectations about what can be made available become (or are) much 
more sophisticated.42 The prospect is that the availability of content across multiple platforms may 
not lead to greater diversity. There is no reason to expect that the commercial imperatives that were 
likely to lead to narrow programming choices in the traditional media environment will not apply in 
the media ecosystem: “…multi-platform distribution is in some senses liable to encourage 
standardization around safe and popular themes and brands.”43 
Digital technologies and multi-platforms provide opportunities for new entrants to the content 
creation market. YouTube, for example, is evidence of significant user-generated content activity. 
That activity may move from the amateur to the professional, but regardless of how or whether it 
develops there is clearly a user appetite for the non-professional content production as well as the 
professional.44 What is less clear is whether new entrants to the market can develop sufficient scale 
and presence or will remain marginal and/or niche.  Funding will also be a factor. 
There is greater scope for the user to pay for content, but the increased competition for audiences 
and content may also place increased pressure on subscription revenues.45 Attempts to charge for 
content online may face the hurdle also of a cultural bias towards free access to web content.46 
Whilst, there is evidence of increased uptake of paywalls, it is not yet clear how effective they will be 
as a business model.47 But requiring payment for content, especially if it is programming that may be 
seen as having public interest qualities, will raise concerns about access to public interest content by 
those who may not be able to afford pay services. Even the ability to pay does not guarantee that the 
public will choose the programming that provides the greatest social benefits. Even though they may 
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value its availability, either for themselves or for the community at large, they may not factor in these 
benefits in their media purchase decision.48 Regardless of the converged digital environment, the 
merit good problem appears likely to continue. 
So it seems that there may be a sustained need for some provision to be made that ensures the 
availability of public interest programming. However, if the public broadcaster continues with its 
traditional form of delivery, there is a risk that it becomes marginalized. This risk is exacerbated if 
funding sources are limited. In fact, the BBC in the UK 49  and in Australia the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), a similar but much smaller version of the BBC, have been quite 
successful in adapting to the new environment, using the Internet to stream programs, provide 
catch-up television and radio services, enhance content, and encourage audience involvement and 
collaboration. Indeed, not constrained by the same commercial imperatives as commercial 
broadcasters, they may be able to adapt more readily to new modes of delivery.50 Certainly, the ABC 
is clear about its ambition as a public broadcaster to claim the digital space: “By reaching all 
Australians, with a presence on all major delivery platforms, and a comprehensive range of news and 
quality, trusted programming, the ABC ensures all Australians can participate in the national debate, 
and is integral to the development of a population with wide-ranging intellectual and creative 
curiosity.”51 
Nevertheless, it may be appropriate in the context of the media ecosystem – an environment in 
which activity will be diffuse, fragmented, one-to-one, one-to-many, push-pull, and perhaps lumpy 
rather than flat52 – to ask whether a monolithic public broadcaster is still the best way to ensure that 
public interest content is available. Can the same policy goal be achieved through a more diversified 
approach? One advantage of the public broadcaster model is that it is likely to be readily identifiable 
and to have a presence. Public broadcasters such as the ABC and the BBC also have mandates that 
require them to have universal reach. They may be much more able to provide “easy access to and 
„discoverability‟ of public service content.” 53  But this model is only feasible where there is an 
established ubiquitous and publicly funded broadcaster with a remit enabling it to move across the 
multiple-platforms (and a political commitment to its sustainability). 
Another issue arises, however. Both of these jurisdictions have also imposed some programming 
obligations on the commercial sector. In Australia, this has been much more minimalist and has 
focused on certain types of content such as “Australian” content and children‟s content, whereas in 
the UK there has been a much greater commitment to public service broadcasting. However, if it 
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becomes increasingly difficult to impose or sustain these programming obligations, there is a risk 
that the public broadcaster must become the repository of all public interest values.54 This potential 
structural lack of diversity is a concern. Ofcom‟s research, conducted as part of its public service 
broadcasting review, indicated that audiences wanted a choice of public service provisions.55 Ofcom 
predicted that in the longer term, privileged access to spectrum would no longer provide sufficient 
incentive – in the form of an implicit subsidy – to accept programming obligations.56 Amongst its 
proposals for alternative ways of securing public service content, Ofcom canvassed additional 
measures such as direct funding schemes or industry levies, to encourage provision of public service 
content.57 It favored a competitive funding scheme awarding contracts to content providers who 
were not necessarily traditional broadcasters, which could deliver long-term output, probably with a 
focus on particular genres.58 In an earlier review Ofcom had proposed a publicly funded, non-profit 
Public Service Publisher that would commission content and then act as publisher arranging the 
content‟s distribution across a range of platforms, with a particular online focus. 59  Whilst the 
proposal ensured some sectoral diversity, there was a risk that it might actually dilute the resources 
of the established public service broadcasters. The concept might still be useful for operating any 
direct funding schemes that may be established, but the establishment of a new body may not be 
necessary when it is likely that there are cultural funding agencies already in place. 
This section has focused on sectoral regulation. Use of a public sector to balance commercially 
funded broadcasting has been a common mechanism, but if it is to have a continuing role it must be 
able to adapt to new platforms to ensure that its public mandate extends as widely as possible. It has 
been suggested that there is still a role for this type of instrument but that other schemes may need 
to be put in place to ensure that there is a diversity of public interest content provisions. Funding 
schemes may be a useful model to adopt – for those jurisdictions that have a public broadcaster 
model in place as well as for those which do not – and indeed may be politically and commercially 
more acceptable than the establishment of any type of publicly funded broadcasting institution.60 
Spectrum auctions and license fee revenue could be potential funding sources. 
Regulatory Tool II: Structuring the Market through Ownership and Control Regulation 
Another form of structural regulation has been the imposition of rules restricting media ownership 
and control. Curiously this has been the one area in which the press has also been caught within the 
regulatory net. This regulatory tool has perhaps had the most common currency across jurisdictions 
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such as the US, Australia, and Europe, even though one might find significantly different 
approaches in these jurisdictions in other aspects of media regulation. It has been highly 
controversial even when the media environment was in a more static form, no doubt because it 
interferes directly with the ability of business to determine its own investment decisions and 
direction. As a regulatory tool, it is also a highly sensitive one for governments and regulators. It 
would not be surprising to see that pressure to relax ownership and control rules will be at the 
forefront of deliberations about how regulation should respond to the broadband age. The 
Australian Convergence Review has already flagged ownership and control rules as problematic.61 
One of the difficulties is that media control rules are vulnerable to challenge because there are 
inherent design weaknesses. For example, in Australia the rules apply only to free-to-air radio and 
television services, and to the press, under a cross-media regime. This leaves subscription services 
completely outside this specific regime and has, for example, allowed News Corporation Ltd. 
(associated with Rupert Murdoch) to hold a 25% stake in Foxtel, the dominant subscription 
television provider in Australia, in addition to significant print media control. Examples of such 
design weaknesses – the result often of uneasy compromises between governments and industry – 
can also be found in the US and UK ownership and control schemes.62 
What is the future of ownership and control rules as a regulatory tool? It is worth noting that despite 
reforms or attempts to reform in the last decade (the US in 2003, the UK in 2003, and Australia in 
2006), some form of ownership and control regulation has remained in place. However, it is likely 
that the pressure for reform and even abandonment of these rules will build. The Australian 
Convergence Review Background Paper comments that “existing media diversity rules… do not 
reflect the diversity represented by other content services including subscription television, new 
managed IPTV services and the range of internet services such as download services catch-up TV, 
and social media.”63 An underlying policy assumption for ownership and control regulation is that 
diversity of ownership will produce a diversity of voice and view. Whilst this is a problematic 
assumption,64 it nevertheless has a role in the diversity regulatory basket because the contemplation 
of monopoly control of mass media seems instinctively at odds with its very role within the public 
sphere. As Baker has suggested, “[t]he key goal, the key value, served by ownership dispersal is that 
it directly embodies a fairer, more democratic allocation of communicative power.” 65  The 
Convergence Review‟s focus on other content services as evidencing diversity is a familiar rationale, 
but it fails to investigate whether these services constitute diversity of delivery modes or true 
diversity of content. Instead, what we are likely to see is a move across platforms and services to 
seek control of the value chain, across content and distribution.66 
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While controls over ownership may be important as a diversity measure, it seems difficult to 
envisage this regulatory tool being adapted to suit the new media ecosystem. First, it may not be easy 
to capture meaningfully the differing points of control within the regulatory net, especially as the 
distribution and content functions increasingly operate separately. Furthermore, established ways of 
articulating these rules may be difficult to sustain. For example, under the Australian rules (Section 
53 of the 1992 Broadcasting Services Act 1992) a commercial television (free-to-air) broadcaster is 
prevented from controlling licenses reaching more than 75% of the Australian population. However, 
the major television networks that are subject to this rule offer Internet television services that can 
reach all Australians provided they have an Internet connection. Second, it is probably unrealistic to 
expect that governments will have the political will to extend these rules. This in turn will add to the 
pressure for relaxation or removal from the media sectors subject to such rules. Nevertheless, at 
least while the traditional media platforms remain mainstream, these rules in some form are likely to 
stay in place. 
One way of addressing the difficulties of adapting this regulatory tool is to adopt a more 
discretionary-based approach such as a public interest test, which might allow intervention when for 
example a particular control situation threatens diversity. Such an approach allows for flexibility in 
being able to take into account new technologies or services, but it also generates uncertainty if one 
has to rely upon case-by-case decisions.67 Furthermore, unless the determination is in the hands of 
an independent regulatory body, there is a risk of political interference. 
The situation seems unsatisfactory and to leave one dependent upon the application of general 
competition law. It will be suggested below that competition law does have an increasingly 
important role to play in the media ecosystem, but it is not satisfactory in all circumstances. Media 
ownership rules were generally introduced because it was considered that competition rules, with 
their focus on particular markets, did not sufficiently safeguard diversity. This has been 
acknowledged by the EU which has permitted member states to impose additional rules to protect 
diversity.68 The UK has introduced a media plurality public interest test into its competition law,69 
but its potential for flexibility is limited. The test was introduced directly in relation to the 2003 
relaxation of media ownership rules, and was an acknowledgement of the limits of competition law. 
However, in general it only applies to merger situations affecting the media that would have been 
captured under the old ownership and control rules, hence, free-to-air radio and television and 
newspapers. The UK test reflects the tradition of UK public broadcasting principles and, in addition 
to considerations such as the necessity for a plurality of persons with control, takes into account the 
need for a wide range of broadcasting that is of high quality and caters to a wide variety of tastes and 
interests.70 Alternatively, a public interest test could focus more specifically on matters such as a 
diversity of sources of information and opinion.71 This might raise for consideration matters broader 
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than just who is in control. Such public interest tests have been developed or proposed in the 
context of the traditional media, but a public interest test in the broadband space may have to be 
substantially reconfigured. So while this regulatory tool may have a continuing role for some time 
and in relation to some elements of the media ecosystem, it seems difficult to envisage a way in 
which it will adapt and survive. This may seem a weak position to adopt, and there are suggestions 
of ways to adapt this regulatory tool. Baker, for example, suggests a prohibition on media firms 
creating new media enterprises.72 However, the inherited design flaws militate against the extension 
of these rules to accommodate effectively the complexity of the new environment. Subject to the 
comments made above, the most useful way to move forward may be the development of a 
comprehensive public interest test to be applied to media mergers, although market definition may 
continue to be a hurdle.  
Regulatory Tool III: Content Diversity 
For some jurisdictions, structuring the market has not been seen as sufficient to guarantee content 
or program diversity. In Australia for example, specific measures have been in place that require 
commercial free-to-air broadcasters 73  and subscription television services 74  to meet certain 
requirements in relation to Australian content, to avoid the risk that broadcasters would otherwise 
opt for cheaper imported programming. Such concerns about local content, and associated 
measures, are familiar in Canada and the European Union. Children‟s programming is another such 
area of concern, one to which even the US has responded.75 There is much that is problematic about 
these types of rules, especially the local content regimes with their mix of cultural and trade 
motivations. Indeed, this can produce curious outcomes. In Australia, as a result of a trade 
agreement with New Zealand, Australian content also includes New Zealand-produced content. 
Such obligations have been able to be imposed as part of the trade-off for access to valuable 
spectrum. But such compacts come under pressure as television-like services appear on alternative 
platforms and there is incentive to sell off spectrum. As indicated earlier, it is as yet unclear in 
Australia whether IPTV services will be treated as a “broadcasting service” under the Broadcasting 
Services Act. Nevertheless, the free-to-air commercial broadcasters, represented by FreeTV 
Australia, have already raised concerns about the potential for regulatory imbalance.76 
In Australia, like other jurisdictions, the switching off of analogue television services as they convert 
to digital will free up spectrum.77 In Australia this is referred to as the “digital dividend.” Australia 
has elected to auction off the spectrum frequencies that will be particularly suitable for mobile 
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telecommunications and broadband services.78 The impact of these spectrum auctions will be likely 
to limit the willingness or scope for trade-off of regulatory obligations as has been past practice. To 
enable the digital dividend, it will be necessary to move current digital broadcasting services out of 
the digital dividend spectrum and to “restack” the spectrum.79 While in principle this does not 
change the ability for free-to-air commercial broadcasters to offer existing digital services, FreeTV 
Australia has expressed concerns that the restacked spectrum will not allow any spectrum capacity to 
enable them to take advantage of future technology and innovate new services.80 Of course, in one 
sense this represents another attempt by the incumbents to entrench further their position, but what 
one can also see here is the breakdown of the traditional compact. No longer will spectrum be 
handed out to the incumbent broadcasters; but in turn it may make it more difficult to extract 
regulatory promises, especially if similar new services are developing alongside without the same 
regulatory obligations. 
If one argues that other platforms such as IPTV are becoming mainstream then there is a case for 
arguing that the regulatory tool should be applied across the similar new services. However, is it 
necessarily the best course to map the old paradigm onto the new? Will this create sufficient 
incentive to produce quality innovative public interest content? There are practical issues as well. 
The new IPTV services will most likely be subscription-based and the users might be looking for a 
different type of programming. If the regulatory burden is seen as too onerous, there is likely to be 
regulatory bypass which may further limit the prospect for investment in public interest content. As 
canvassed earlier, creating funding schemes might be a more useful way to encourage investment in 
public interest content. Other incentives could involve a reduction in license fees or spectrum 
pricing in return for investment in certain types of programming.81 
Here again, it seems that the old familiar regulatory tools may not be sustainable in the longer term. 
However, the media ecosystem may hold out hope in some areas. Over the past decade there has 
been a concern about the closure of local radio and television newsrooms in regional areas of 
Australia and the consequent loss of local information and news. The availability of broadband sites 
may assist with the delivery and creation (locally) of local content.82 
Regulatory Tool IV: Ethical Standards 
Ethical standards are an area of content regulation that can be easily overlooked in the broadband 
space. Although the approach and especially the regulatory design may have been very different, 
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Australia, Europe, and the US have all imposed at different stages various rules or standards that can 
also encourage diversity, and control who has access to the medium. The US Fairness Doctrine was 
one such example, as are rules relating to no-editorializing (in the UK) or fairness in the way opinion 
is presented. For example, rules about the relationship between editorial and commercial content are 
relevant to matters of who has access to the media space and the public‟s access to information and 
ideas. In part, these rules are also concerned with the quality or integrity of the information and 
opinions being communicated. In other words, they provide a way for the content to be mediated 
for the audience in terms of its authenticity, trustworthiness, and reliability. As noted earlier, 
Habermas and Sunstein have suggested that, in the absence of this mediation role, it may be difficult 
for the public to negotiate the vast mass of information that can be accessed through the Internet. 
Therefore ethical standards, in relation to content creation, are important for diversity. When 
content regulation is discussed in the broadband environment, it is generally in the context of 
regulation of harmful or illegal content, but there is rarely discussion around how to protect the civic 
space. To some extent the EU‟s Audiovisual Media Services Directive has attempted this because 
the basic tier of obligations imposed on both linear and non-linear services includes obligations such 
as separation of commercial and editorial content. However, the scope is limited in terms of the 
obligations imposed and the activities covered. 
Although this article has tended to focus on the professional or corporate sector, here there is an 
opportunity for a much broader regulatory net.  There is scope for the development of a basic set of 
principles that represent those ethical standards that can help the mediation process.  The following 
principles 83   could serve as a starting point for the development of a simple code of ethical 
standards: 
• Accuracy and fact-checking. 
• Fairness – ensuring that viewpoints are not misrepresented.  
• Transparency – disclosing any potential or actual conflicts.  
• Independence – not accepting a benefit from someone who might seek to influence the 
content. 
In the media ecosystem, the regulatory imposition of this code might vary depending upon the 
media involved and the extent to which they represent the mainstream media voice. But for the 
blogger, citizen journalist, or the small independent online journalism endeavor, adherence to the 
code could in fact become a marketing or promotional tool. Unlike the established media that is able 
to trade off reputations established through other delivery platforms, gaining a presence and an 
identity may be more difficult for the independent sector. The code may assist this presence and 
benefit diversity by adding to the availability of trusted voices. 
It is likely that a self-regulatory model would be the most effective mechanism. Adoption of the 
code‟s principles could be signaled by some labeling device, which could in turn serve as a way to 
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promote the activity as a trusted site. Further matters would need to be considered such as who 
would be custodian of the code and the role of the custodian. Would it simply act as a point for sites 
to obtain labeling, or would it take a more active monitoring role or even provide a 
complaint/breach of code handling process? 
Encouraging ethical editorial standards will be important in the media ecosystem, but again may be 
difficult to ensure comprehensively. This small scenario illustrates the way in which regulation could 
be used creatively and seen positively. 
Regulatory Tool V: Competition Regulation 
As a regulatory tool, competition regulation has much to do with structuring the market. However, 
while an established regulatory instrument in the media sector, it is seen as having less direct 
relevance to media diversity policies. There is every reason to expect that general competition law, 
such as merger regulation, will continue to have a role, even if the continued use of the more 
specific instrument of ownership and control regulation is less clear. 
Where competition regulation will have an increasing importance and relevance in the media 
ecosystem is in the use of industry-specific ex ante competition rules that can help shape the market 
or behavior within the market. Such rules – for example those that make provision for access, must 
carry, bundling practices, and transparency and non-discriminatory dealing – are useful for dealing 
with particular market characteristics such as natural monopolies and vertical integration, and where 
general competition law with its reliance on ex post regulatory enforcement may be inadequate. Use 
of these rules is already well-established in jurisdictions like the UK and the US, but much less so in 
Australia. 84  Although this type of regulatory tool operates in a context that seeks to promote 
economic competition, it can have an important role to play in promoting access for the public to a 
broader range of programming and services. 
Much will depend upon the business models that emerge as superfast broadband ubiquity continues 
to open up content distribution platforms and new content distributors emerge.85 In Australia, as 
new delivery models produce new business models, concerns are being raised about the scope for 
anti-competitive behavior; a concern that is perhaps highlighted in a regulatory environment that has 
lacked an effective competition regulatory instrument, and where most access seekers have had to 
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deal with a vertically- and horizontally-integrated and dominant telecommunications company.86 For 
example, traditional broadcasters have controlled both distribution and content, either as producers 
or rights holders. Faced with fragmenting audiences, they will seek to find new distribution avenues 
in order to reach audiences who are increasingly using the Internet to access content.87 These other 
avenues may offer new opportunities or new competition for the established broadcasting models. 
Currently, in Australia, most of the free-to-air broadcasters have begun to offer catch-up television 
services via their own websites, but these services may be more vulnerable in quality compared to 
IPTV services. 
Convergence may also bring a change in the business model, as the platform or distribution 
providers change from their “common carrier” model to become also content providers.88 The 
position held in the value chain and the potential for vertical integration will be significant.89 FreeTV 
Australia has expressed its concern about the scope for differential pricing by carriers and ISPs to 
favor their own content or the content of associated providers and to discriminate against third 
party providers.90 A related problem in Australia is that Internet service provision usually imposes 
caps on the amount of data a customer can download. Once a limit is reached, significant charges 
may be imposed or the service slowed. This practice affects the type of content that can be 
downloaded.91 From a competition perspective, it also imposes risks because some carriers and 
service providers may choose to allow certain content as unmetered. Typically, this means that a 
provider favors content with which it has an association, or with whom it may have made a 
commercial arrangement. 92  The following example illustrates some of these tensions. An IPTV 
service called FetchTV recently began operating in Australia. FetchTV delivers its service via four 
broadband ISPs. However, it is not able to deliver its service via one of the main broadband ISPs, 
Bigpond, because that service is operated by Telstra which has its own interest in providing content, 
especially given its connection with the pay-TV provider Foxtel. Meanwhile, FetchTV is delivered as 
unmetered content via the ISPs with which it does have arrangements. This will make it attractive to 
the viewer compared to services delivered as web or Internet TV, which are likely to be included in a 
customer‟s download quota. 
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further competitive advantages.  
91 ACMA, IPTV and Internet Delivery Models, 23. 
92 See also Australian Broadcasting Corporation, National Broadband Network: Regulatory Reform for 21st Century Broadband, 
Discussion Paper, June 3, 2009, accessed Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/115323/Australian_Broadcasting_Corporation_ABC.pdf.   
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As indicated, competition regulation will become increasingly important in the broadband age as 
shown by the US Federal Communications Commission‟s (FCC) net neutrality rules. This may not 
be such a challenge for those jurisdictions with an already well-developed set of ex ante tools. 
However, it will be important to articulate clearly the role this regulatory tool has in the promotion 
of diversity and not see it as peripheral to the diversity discourse. The regulatory basket could 
include functional separation to address the potential for discrimination by those businesses that 
combine distribution networks and content services; access regimes to ensure fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory terms of access; rules to prevent anti-competitive bundling of services and 
content; and must carry rules to ensure that public interest content is accessible across all platforms.  
 
A FURTHER THOUGHT: UNIVERSAL SERVICE        
Whether this is thought of as a policy principle or regulatory approach may or may not be 
significant, but the concept of universal service may be helpful in the broadband age. The concept is 
familiar within the telecommunications sector but it has not been as clearly articulated within the 
media context, although it has had an implicit role in regulatory arrangements to ensure that 
broadcasting services were available and accessible.93 Universal service obligations may be necessary 
in the converged environment: “Historically, communications platforms, such as fixed phone lines 
or TV, were either available everywhere at a uniform price or not available at all. Increasingly, 
platforms do not display these characteristics and companies only wish to roll out platforms where it 
is profitable to do so.”94 
Universal service may also be helpful in responding to growing expectations that users will pay to 
access content. Increasingly, access to distribution services and content requires payment with the 
risk that a significant section of the public may be locked out of access to information and opinion. 
Thus there may be a role for universal service in ensuring that there is affordable access to 
mainstream distribution platforms and to the content that enables the public to continue to be 
engaged in and connected to the community. Universal service obligations may be imposed as an 
end in themselves or the elaboration of universal service principles may help in the selection and 
design of the regulatory space.95 
                                                            
93 In Australia, transitional arrangements have been made for universal service provision in the context of the NBN, and 
consultation is occurring to deal with the delivery of these obligations, but to date these arrangements have been 
concerned only with traditional universal service, such as access to basic telephony services and public interest services 
(emergency service for example). For further information on the Australian Government‟s arrangements and 
consultations, see Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy [hereinafter BCDE], Universal 
Service Policy in the National Broadband Network Environment, accessed Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/broadband/national_broadband_network/universal_service_policy. However, there has not 
yet been any policy consideration of the concept of universal service in the broadband age. 
94 Ofcom, What is Convergence?, ¶ 5.16. 
95 Natali Helberger, “The „Right to Information‟ and Digital Broadcasting – About Monsters, Invisible Men, and the 
Future of European Broadcasting Regulation,” Entertainment Law Review 17, no. 2 (2006): 70. Helberger discusses 
universal service in the context of how to ensure fair and affordable access to broadcasting content.   
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CONCLUSION        
This article has tried to investigate the possible impact of the broadband age on familiar regulatory 
approaches and to ask whether those regulatory approaches will have a continued role in enabling 
the media to function within the public sphere. The media ecosystem and the regulatory space is in 
transition and it may be that current regulatory arrangements will have a role for some time, but it 
seems that in the longer term they may be unsustainable.   
It has been argued that there will still be a need for some intervention in the broadband era – that 
the discipline of the market will not provide the diversity needed for the media to fulfill its role. 
Sectoral regulation will still have a role although it will need to be supplemented with regulatory 
incentives such as funding schemes. This article is pessimistic about the longer-term viability of 
media ownership and control regulation and there may be a need to rely increasingly on merger 
regulation, perhaps with some modification, to address media concentration. Ex ante competition 
regulation will have an increasing role. There could be scope for a more positive engagement with 
some aspects of content regulation, especially in the important area of content integrity. 
Much of this discussion may have seemed speculative, but the advent of the Australian Convergence 
Review is a sharp reminder that speculation is rapidly turning into reality. The outcomes of that 
review will show whether the established media policy values considered in this article are to be 
protected or rendered more vulnerable.   
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